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Abstract
The number of company mergers and acquisition activities has increased dramatically the last
two decades. The reasons for conducting these activities are many and the uncertainties of their
results are high. To reduce the uncertainties when making an investment, merger or acquisition
it is vital to do a thorough assessment of the risks involved with the activity. This thesis focuses
on a specific part of this risk assessment, namely the non-financial risks.
Mergers and acquisitions are done in almost all industries around the world and the reasons
for and benefits of these activities can vary between industries. We have chosen to investigate the
risk assessment of non-financial risks in the Information and Communication Technology (ICT)
industry.
The thesis aims at investigating what business characteristics, for companies in the ICT indus-
try, that give rise to non-financial risks that must be assessed when doing investments, mergers
or acquisitions. Further on we present a risk pattern that points out what business character-
istics that are the most important when conducting a risk assessment of non-financial risks on
companies in the ICT industry.
From a literature study we find evidence that ten different business characteristics are of key
interest when targeting companies in the ICT industry. These ten characteristics are firm size,
business phase, governance, market strategy, funding, innovation process, network dependencies,
outsourcing, product properties and geographic location.
Out of these ten we are able to distinguish four that are of most importance since they give
rise not only to the highest amount of risks but also affect parts throughout the entire company.
The four characteristics that are of particular interest in the risk assessment process are: gover-
nance, innovation process, network dependencies and outsourcing. The common denominator for
these four business characteristics are that they are all connected to uncertainties that a single
company itself cannot completely control, but stem from its interaction with other actors. The
four characteristics all deal with the interaction between a company and its eco-system and all
risks can hence only be identified after a thorough risk assessment. We see clear connections be-
tween the importance of the four business characteristics and the strong globalization process that
characterizes the ICT industry, and we propose that the risk assessment process is modernized to
fit with the current corporate environment.
This Bachelor thesis is conducted at the School of Business, Economics and Law in Gothenburg
on behalf of Bearing Consulting Ltd. Bearing Consulting Ltd is a London based consultancy firm
with presence in UK, Sweden, Spain and South Africa. Bearing’s core competencies consist of
financial and management consultancy including the due diligence process in investments, mergers
and acquisitions.
We want to thank our tutor at the university, O¨sten Ohlsson, as well as Magnus Fransson and
Jo¨rgen Eriksson at Bearing Consulting for their support and feedback throughout the work with
this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Back in the year 1990, the Swiss-Swedish electronics conglomerate ABB, one of the world’s largest
electrical engineering companies, bought the American engineering firm Combustable Engineering.
The acquisition went through despite Combustable Engineering’s pending law suits from former
employees that had been harmed by the company’s asbestos lined boilers produced in the 1970s.
In 2002, ABB was on the brink of bankruptcy due to the over 100,000 claims that had cost the
company approximately five billion USD in total. All this due to an acquisition where risks were
neglected and responsibilities not being taken seriously.
1.1 Background
The number of corporate mergers and acquisitions around the world has increased dramatically
the last two decades, both in number of transactions and in total value[74]. The reasons behind
mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are several, among them to reduce costs, capture new technol-
ogy, enter new markets or to create synergies with existing business functions. Companies proudly
announce M&As as great possibilities that will take the businesses to a new level, but it is not
often mentioned that a large part of such activities fail to bring value to the buyer. Common
estimates say that only about half of the total transactions are profitable to the buyer, that the
total earnings of all M&A activity average to zero [13].
With this background, a drastic increase in M&A activity but with a high failure rate, there
is of course great interest in methods increasing the probability of merger success. Therefore,
the buying company normally conduct a so called due diligence process to thoroughly assess
the properties’ of the targeted company. In this process either the company itself or an external
consultancy firm decide whether the proposed merger should go through or not and to what price.
Among other things, various kinds of risks connected to the target company are evaluated. It is
common to separate financial risk, the risk that a company does not have adequate cash flow to
meet financial obligations, from non-financial risk. In this thesis we will focus on the non-financial
risks involved in mergers and acquisitions.
While financial risk easily can be quantified and accessed through the accounting documents,
non-financial risk can to the largest extent only be assessed subjectively and is almost impossible
to quantify. Examples of non-financial risks range from losing key personnel, theft of intellectual
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property, exposure to corruption, environmental law suits and loss of good will, to name just but
a few. It is argued that a combination of financial and non-financial factors need to be considered
to increase the ability of predicting business failure[75].
This thesis will focus on the information and communication technology (ICT) industry, a
global industry characterized by a high pace and a dynamic market place where handling of
technical knowledge and inter-actor dependencies are vital to survival. In such a dynamic and
emerging market a company can go from being market leader to leave business in a very short
time, thus it is of great importance to detect possible risks in time and have a plan on how to
handle them.
1.2 Aim
The original base for our work was a task description by Bearing Consulting. The task description
was very ”open” and dealt with constructing mean risk profiles for various industries. It became
obvious that in order to be able to contribute in this field of work this task needed to be interpreted
and defined more narrowly. Discussions with Bearing Consulting and further research into the
subject helped formulate a more narrow and applicable aim that this thesis then was based upon.
The basic aim of this thesis is to improve and support Bearing Consulting in their work with
due diligence and risk assessment in mergers, acquisitions and investments in the ICT-industry.
This is to be done by analyzing and mapping what the main sources of risk in businesses in the
ICT-industry are. When those main sources are known, hopefully the identification process of
risks in a specific company is simplified.
The thesis aims at giving a holistic picture of the risks involved in M&A activity. The span
is very wide, something that we look upon as the purpose of the report. We do not in this thesis
want to conduct research with a very narrow and limited scope about a certain phenomenon, but
instead look at the big picture and try to examine the main risks and possible pattern between
risks in the ICT industry. This holistic approach is in our view the strength and purpose of the
thesis and the reader must keep this in mind when following our work.
1.3 Research questions
With the aim of this thesis formulated as above, two research questions were constructed to create
a possible way to approach the huge world of business risks:
1. What general business characteristics are the sources of risks that arise in mergers and
acquisition activities in the information and communication technology (ICT) industry?
With business characteristics we mean common factors that can be used to describe and
categorize companies. This could be for example their size, age or geographic location, but also
more operational characteristics that relate to how companies work and organize their day to day
activities. Our idea is that risk sources must be dependent on specific business characteristics,
or risks would be equal in all businesses. If it is possible to identify the business characteristics
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that trigger most risk, this information can be used as a focus point in the due diligence risk
assessment process.
2. Based on the answer from the first question, is it possible to create a risk pattern that
identify the most important sources of business risk in mergers and acquisition activities, and how
would such a pattern look like?
If it is possible to answer the first question, we want to use this information to dig further into
business risk. The idea here is to try to find a pattern that is unique to the ICT-industry. We are
interested in investigating if there are certain characteristics that are more important than others
and if they have anything in common.
1.4 Limitations
By request from Bearing Consulting the acquired organizations to consider are limited to their
present customers’ area of interest: small and medium sized enterprises (SME) within the infor-
mation and communication technologies (ICT) industry. We use the European Commission’s[19]
definition, which define SME as enterprises with a staff force lower than 250 people and an annual
turnover of 50 million euro or less. We will only consider non-financial risks, meaning that we will
not look into financial nor legal risks. This is because financial and legal risks are not normally
assessed by Bearing Consulting, but instead made by external partners. We have no limitations
regarding the acquiring companies.
1.5 Thesis justification
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, there has been a drastic increase in M&A activity the last
decades. Despite that, there is not much literature or analyses of what makes M&A activities
successfull[28].
In a highly competitive and dynamic industry such as the ICT industry companies can not
afford to neglect projects with high risks. Reichardt[79] states that there is good evidence to
expect that companies that take on high risks are also those that become the most successful.
This is under the condition that they work active with evaluation and assessment of the risks
involved to be able to make decisions on a reliable decision base. The same author claims that
risk assessment of non-financial risks are particularly important when investment costs are high,
when market actors place little focus on non-core activities or if relationships exists with actors in
geographic locations with less respect to environmental, health or safety legislations. All of those
terms are highly characteristic for the ICT industry and non-financial risks should therefore be
considered important.
Although non-financial risks can be considered important they are rarely targeted for closer
investigation in the due diligence process.When working with financial risk assessment there is
often guiding principles of what result that is expected, that is however not the case with non-
financial risks. There are currently no standards in which results can be measured and evaluated
and therefore further research in the subject is necessary[79]. M&A teams are specialists in
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conducting M&A activities by identifying possible acquisition targets based on financial data.
M&A teams are rarely equipped to identify or value non-financial risks. The result is often that
non-financial risks are excluded from the risk assessment process which results in decisions based
on unreliable bases. To be able to accurately assess business risks for targets to investment, merge
or acquire both financial and non-financial risks need to be evaluated[75].
1.6 Thesis outline
In this short introduction chapter we want to give the reader an initial insight into the subject
as well as explaining the purpose of our report and what questions we want to answer. The next
chapter describe the basic concepts that the reader need to have knowledge about before entering
the field that this thesis deal with. We use this chapter do define words and expressions that we
will then use throughout the remainder of the report. The following chapter describe the method
of how we have conducted our work and how the material, which is presented in the subsequent
chapter, is gathered and structured. In the last three chapters our findings are published. First
the analysis, where the material is reviewed and used in order to answer our research questions.
After this we have a discussion where we take one step back to view the subject in a broader
perspective. Lastly the conclusion shortly presents our main findings.
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Chapter 2
Conceptual explanations
In this chapter we will go through the most relevant concepts and terms that are used in practice in
the field of risk assessment in investments, mergers and acquisitions. The purpose of the chapter
is to give the reader an insight and understanding of the world that this thesis takes place in, and
to convey what basic assumptions and framework that this thesis is based upon. We start with
describing the risk expression and then move on to describing how risk is looked upon in business
and how it is treated in the due diligence process in mergers and acquisition activities. Then the
ICT industry and its characteristics are described, followed by a section that describe the tool
that Bearing Consulting use in their risk assessment process. In a typical thesis disposition this
chapter would be called theory, but we have chosen not to use that label since the content is more
of an explanatory nature not used as a tool for the analysis.
2.1 Risks from a corporate perspective
Every company in every industry is exposed to risk [23, 26]. However, there are several similar
concepts that are easily confused with risks, such as uncertainty and probability. The reference
work when it comes to financial risk and uncertainty is Knight [50]. He makes a clear distinction
between risk and uncertainty. Risk is according to his definition calculable, where the risk equals
the product of the probability and consequences of occurrence. For example, you may calculate
that there is a 15 percent probability that something will go wrong, and that if it happens will
cost you approximately 100 euro. Uncertainty, on the other hand, occur when the likelihood of
future events are indefinable or incalculable. There is no way of determining the probability that
an uncertain event will happen.
There is often confusion between the three concepts of risk, uncertainty and probability. Prob-
ability is mathematical likelihood that something will occur [61], for example the probability of
losing money in an investment opportunity is 15 percent. It is, with the definitions we have chosen,
not correct to say that there is a probability of losing money. This way of using the probability
term is often found in literature where answers concerning probability sometimes are descriptions
of the possible problem [51]. There is also a common confusion between risk and uncertainty,
where uncertainty means that we do not know what the exact probability or consequence of an
occurrence will be[51].
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Risks do not always have negative meaning but can also express a positive scenario. An
example of a positive risk is the risk of lowered interest rate on a company’s debt. What also has
to be taken under consideration is that a single risk can have negative impact on one company
while the same risk can have positive impact on another company. Evaluation of risks therefore
needs to be considered from a single company’s perspective. Whether or not the risk concept can
be expressed in positive terms or not is debated among writers[51].
From a corporate perspective it is easy to make decisions concerning situations that are certain
to occur. Complications set in when situations suffer from uncertainties, a situation when it is not
possible to forecast the future within reasonable misjudgment. These complicated uncertainties
arise when situations are not known, certain, measurable or controllable[38]. The uncertainties
of which managers or investors have no influence on are numerous, including global economic
instabilities, shifting governments, weather hazards or terrorist acts.
Risks and uncertainties do not have to come from such extraordinary events but can arise
from the business environment in which the company serves. These risks concern variations in
competition conditions, technology requirements and types of relationships within the company’s
network of actors and resources [20].
To be able to use the concept of risk in a practical manner throughout the thesis we make no
distinction between risk and uncertainty and we exclusively regard risk to be related to occurrences
that have negative impact on companies.
2.2 Due Diligence in investments, mergers and acquisitions
One definition says that due diligence is ”a process of enquiry and investigation made by a
prospective purchaser in order to confirm that it is buying what it thinks it is buying” [41]. When
conducting the non-financial risk assessment in a due diligence process, the usual procedure is
simply to interview key personnel in the target company with the intention to create a good picture
of the company and reveal any hidden concerns. Due diligence has become norm in decision
making regarding joint ventures, investments, mergers and acquisitions [85] and is carried out by
or for the investor or acquirer on the subjected company after reaching a preliminary agreement
but before signing a binding contract [9]. The purpose is to assess the benefits and the liabilities of
a proposed investment or acquisition by looking into the relevant aspects such as, but not limited
to, finance, legal, commercial, HR & culture, management, environment, intellectual property,
operational and technical [41]. This is done with respect to the company’s past, present and
future[54] with the following objectives[41]:
• verification of assets and liabilities
• identification and quantification of risks
• protection needed against such risks
• identification of synergy benefits
• post-acquisition planning
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In this thesis we are interested in the second point: identification and quantification of risk.
Some authors claim risk assessment to be the primary reason of the due diligence process[77, 54]
and its aim is simply to reduce the risk of unpleasant surprises occurring post-purchase and to use
as leverage when negotiating the price for a possible acquisition or investment, where the possible
cost of a probable risk can be deducted from the end price.
2.3 Risk Assessment
The way of looking at risks that expose businesses has changed during the last decades. From
a mindset that risks are inaffectable and governed by fate to a mindset that risks are a part of
the day-to-day business process. Risk assessment used to be conducted to evaluate a business
transaction that had gone wrong, but is today instead conducted before the business transaction
as a mean to prevent transaction failure [1]. What differs these mindsets is therefore the ability to
recognize risks, being able to evaluate them and to take appropriate measures with the purpose
of minimizing the risk of occurrence and its consequences [20]. Risk management is today a hot
topic in the business world, and many companies realize the benefits of a continuous risk handling
framework also when not involved in merger and acquisition activities.
2.4 ICT industry characteristics
The purpose if this thesis is to look into non-financial risks in the ICT industry. In order to
understand what risks that effect this industry and how the nature of the industry create certain
types of risk it is necessary to understand some characteristics of the industry. As earlier men-
tioned, ICT stands for information and communication technologies, and includes a wide range of
companies ranging from service providers to manufacturers of physical goods [70]. Products such
as software, mobile phones, IT-systems and communication network providers all fall under the
wide ICT industry. The industry is characterized by its fast growth and studies show that it alone
on average has contributed with about 0.5% of the total economic growth annually [18]. The total
economic growth in the European Union and in the United States typically range between 1-3%
[30], meaning that the ICT industry alone the last decades has contributed for a sixth up to half
of the total economic growth in those countries.
Another characteristic typical for the ICT industry is that it is very international and that the
manufacturing processes often are outsourced globally. The business is seen as one of the most
globally dispersed of all and this development seem to continue [3]. Production of both goods and
services are outsourced from European and American companies to low-wage countries such as
India and China. This type of outsourcing, or contract manufacturing, is in many cases inevitable
to keep costs down and most western ICT companies instead focus their efforts on marketing,
sales and research and development, instead of the actual production processes [7]. The industry
is also very fragmented, meaning that no company produces a complete product with all its
components. Instead different companies produce sub-components that are then assembled [3].
This makes some companies very dependent on other companies, since they can not sell their
products directly to the end consumer. As an example is a company that produces small color
LCD-displays dependent on the mobile phone manufacturers’ success in selling their products.
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One last important characteristic for the ICT industry is its heavy reliance on constant in-
novation and product development. This could be done either internally, through utilizing the
knowledge of the personnel, or externally, by acquiring technology from other organizations. This
pressure on innovation, along with the need to go global, explain the strong tendency of ICT
companies to be involved in merger and acquisition activities [12]. This is also confirmed when
studying the 60 ICT companies on the Global Fortune 500 list, where we have found previous
merger and acquisition activities involving 59 of them.
2.5 Bearing Risk Analysis Model
As the above text describes, the purpose of the due diligence work performed by Bearing Con-
sulting and others is to give a comprehensive picture of the target company in an investment,
merger or acquisition. This due diligence model includes several business aspects where one is
risk assessment. In the risk assessment also the company’s environment, such as customers, sup-
pliers, competitors and authorities, are included. The assessment is made on the complete target
company in relation to the investor. An example of the result from a risk analysis is shown in
figure 2.1 below where different risk categories are located in the horizontal axis and the severe-
ness of those risks are presented on the vertical axis. The different risk categories are based on
a company’s functions and its surroundings. The risk assessment process consists of two parts.
The first thing that is done is an estimation of what risk levels that can be expected for each risk
category, shown with the dark bars in figure 2.1. The lighter bars are the final risk profile made
by Bearing Consulting and are specific to each company assessed. To be noted is that the specific
risk profiles, made by Bearing Consulting, are defined subjectively based on available information
about the company and the quantification is not based on mathematical probability theory of risk
propensity and effect.
Figure 2.1: Example of a risk assessment by Bearing Consulting
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In our work we have decided to use the same risk categories as are shown above to make
our research comparable with Bearing Consulting’s model. Literature suggest similar models, for
example Howson[41]. Our meetings with Bearing Consulting and a review of their material used
in the due diligence interviewing process have lead us to the following definitions of the different
risk categories:
2.5.1 Market
This category contains risks that are linked to the market in which the target company interacts.
These risks could include such things as market characteristics, market trends, product portfolio
fitness, major competitors and their development and company strategy.
2.5.2 Operations
Under this category fall risks that can be associated to the everyday operations in the target
company. It includes activities such as knowledge sharing and decision making and the quality
and validity of decisions, but also production techniques and the performance and reliability of
those techniques. Other factors included in this category are dependencies on other actors, such
as suppliers and other cooperative partners.
2.5.3 Technology
In the highly competitive and changing ICT-industry technical knowledge is vital to a firms
success. There is always a risk of losing technological knowledge through leaving personnel and
inadequate patent rights. ICT companies are often acquired because of their technical knowledge
which makes it important for the acquirer to verify that it is buying what it think it is and that
it has the right to use it.
2.5.4 Total Quality Management
This category contains all risks about the quality of a company’s products, operations and suppli-
ers. Quality deficits can be costly both in terms of time and resources, but also through lawsuits
caused due to low quality products that have reached the consumer. Supplier quality cooperation
is also important to look into since supplied goods and services directly influence the quality of
the firm’s products.
2.5.5 IT, Security and Support Systems
Since technological knowledge is of great importance to most companies in the ICT industry it is
important to make sure that knowledge does not leak to other organizations. Sufficient knowledge
about data protection in IT- and support-systems and security routines are examined, as well as
the company’s ability to keep know-how and trade secrets within the organization.
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2.5.6 Human Resources
Aspects concerning the human resources and how they will react to the merger or acquisition are
dealt with here. Key personnel are identified to make sure no vital knowledge is lost. Employee
expectations on the upcoming business transaction are assessed to reduce the risk of losing dis-
appointed staff members. The quality of the management teams and strength and weaknesses
are noted. The organizational culture of the targeted firm is examined and the impact of cul-
tural differences to the buyer is discussed. Motivation and commitment among all staff is also of
concern.
2.5.7 Environment
Liabilities arising from production sites of the target company, and its suppliers, are examined
with regard to the environmental risk they might pose. All production facilities and assets that
the company is responsible for have to be investigated so that no local environmental regulations
have been challenged. Conditions at close suppliers are also important.
2.5.8 Code of Conduct
Any activity that might break against the code of conduct, such as child labor and union issues, are
assessed in order to minimize the risk of unpleasant surprises that can be costly to the acquiring
company’s brand and financials.
2.5.9 Political
The political risk varies to a great extent with the country of origin of the acquired firm and
includes factors such as government stability, corruption, socioeconomic conditions, internal and
external conflicts and religious and ethnic tensions. Such factors are not directly related to the
targeted company but do play a big role in how it is affected by its surroundings.
We hope that the explanation of the above concepts will help the reader to understand the re-
mainder of this thesis. Those concepts are vital and common practice in the world of investments,
mergers and acquisitions.
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Chapter 3
Method
There are two purposes of this chapter: to explain to the reader how work has been conducted to
simplify understanding of the thesis, and to describe why the authors believe the work is reliable
and valid and that conclusions may be drawn that can be used to describe the reality of business
risk in a meaningful way.
3.1 Method outline
Figure 3.1 describes the general steps that have been taken when writing this thesis. The large
white boxes with labels to the right denote which thesis chapter that contains the corresponding
part. The filled areas contain short information about the work that has been carried out in
this step. At this stage the reader is supposed to already have read the introduction and the
conceptual explanation chapters, why further explanation of those chapters will not be made.
This chapter instead mostly deal with how material has been collected and what inclusion and
exclusion criteria we have applied. Lastly, we shortly describe the analysis model.
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Figure 3.1: Thesis working procedure
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3.2 A literature study
Already from the beginning of our work it was clear that we were to conduct a literature study.
The wish that the thesis should be based on earlier research was clearly expressed from Bearing
Consulting in the original task description, and we had no reason to question this. We decided
to use scientific articles that we could access through various electronic databases. Primarily we
were interested in aggregated studies based on real business case studies or statistical information,
and we believed this kind of information would be easily found in articles from various scientific
journals. In addition, the latest and most up to date research is seldom yet published in books, but
only through journal articles[71]. Beforehand we were quite confident that relevant material would
be easy to find, something that were only true to some extent. Corporate risk management itself
is a popular subject, but it became obvious that research on risk in connection with mergers and
acquisitions is not as common. During our extensive literature study and material collection we
did not stumble upon a single article trying to do the same thing as us; summarizing non-financial
risks for a whole industry in connection to M&A and investment activity. This perceived lack of
research on the subject has been confirmed in a number of articles and in contact with researchers
in both Sweden and abroad. Because of this, we were forced to use quite some creativity and
flexibility during the material collection phase since earlier research rarely completely covered our
field of interest: non-financial risks in M&A and investments.
3.3 Qualitative or quantitative method?
Our original plan when we started this study was to make a quantitative study leading to a
clear quantifiable result. We wanted our results to be presented mathematically, where risk and
effect could be calculated for different cases in different situations. The idea was to create a
risk profile that expressed different risks’ probability of occurrence and effect of occurrence in
absolute terms. These two should then be multiplied, so that a number for the total extent of
the risk could be obtained and used to compare different risks. With this quantification method
we intended to create a risk pattern. This method would have been a simplified version of a
quantitative meta-analysis, where data collected from earlier studies should be quantified and
made inter-study-comparable[69].
But as work progressed we realized that this method was not possible. It is in the nature of
non-financial risks to be hard to quantify, and hence also hard to compare or put in relation to
other risks. The only possibility of comparing different types of risks to each other would be to
translate their outcome to monetary terms, something we quickly gave up due to its complexity
and many sources of error. Instead we decided to move the thesis towards a more qualitative
approach. Jansen and Petersen[46] expresses the importance of a qualitative approach by saying:
”How to assess the success of mergers precisely cannot be determined with scientific adequacy,
because all methods employed so far to measure it show systematic weaknesses and take into
account only quantitative criteria.”
The subject of this thesis is in the borderland between the classically quantitative field of
financial economics and the classically qualitative field of organization analysis. A˚sberg[78] claim
that there is no strictly quantitative or qualitative research; instead this is dependent on the
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phenomenon you have chosen to study. Also Patel [71] has similar ideas describing quantitative
and qualitative method as two extremes on the same scale, where research very rarely is conducted
on any of the extremes but instead somewhere in between. Some material that we have used has
been quantified aggregated studies, while some has been qualitative case studies. We decided that
both types of studies are relevant to the thesis and useful to us, since qualitative conclusions can
be drawn also from quantitative studies. Making this decision we further increased the volume
of suitable material and opened up our minds to a possible final result other than a quantifiable
risk pattern. We open minded entered a work process where the end result was of a more implicit
nature.
3.4 Material collection
We have, as mentioned earlier, used various databases with scientific articles in our material
collection process. Primarily we have used three different databases with partially overlapping
content, namely Google Scholar, Science Direct and Business Source Premier. Our initial searches
were limited to only non-financial risks in mergers and acquisitions, but as mentioned before the
research on this is very limited. Only some of the different aspects we are interested in were
covered; topics such as HR and technology were well covered, while for example market and
quality aspects were completely left out. We realized that we needed to broaden our search to
find sufficient data.
During the collection of material it became obvious that the relationship between the acquiring
and acquired company are relevant when estimating risks involved in any M&A activity. We
therefore realized we had three different approaches when collecting material:
1. To only consider target company specific risk and completely neglect the relation to the
acquirer (e.g. environmental, legal, quality, organizational and product type risks)
2. To consider the reasons behind the M&A (capture technology, market channels, IP etc)
3. To consider the relationship between the two companies (geographical, cultural, technolog-
ical, product portfolio etc)
Since we in our case are working on a general level, without a specific case, we do not know
any specific details about neither the acquirer nor the acquired and we are not dealing with
a specific company but a category of companies. Hence, approach two and three above are
not possible. Therefore we decided to take the first approach and identify risk in independent
companies, companies that necessarily had not been involved in a recent merger or acquisition.
We decided that the material only need to concern the target company and can hence be based
on any company in the ICT-industry. This was a vital material inclusion decision which gave us
access to far more material.
Another inclusion decision was made when we decided to treat risk the same way as lack of
success factors. We decided to look at risk as the opposite of chance, two concepts that move in
opposite direction from the same point, one in ”positive” and one in ”negative” direction. By
doing this we were able to use literature about failure, industry crises, critical and hazardous
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factors but also literature about success factors and winning strategies when mapping our risk.
This decision widened the variation of possible keywords, and we decided that we finally had
enough available material for our study.
In our selection process of articles we have used a number of principles. Firstly, to assure
that the article is of adequate scientific quality, we have only included articles that has been
peer-reviewed and approved for publishing in scientific journals. When reading the articles we
have used our own judgment to assess the relevance of the material. We have also looked at the
citing function in the electronic databases, where the number of citations made on the article
is calculated. A high number would typically indicate that the article is accepted and used as
reference in many other researchers’ work. Obviously, there is of course a risk that the article has
been cited as an example of bad or divergent research, but we consider this a minor risk. Some
consideration has also been taken to in which journal an article has been published, and we have
preferred work from well-reputed journals. Most of the articles that were used in the material
collection are very recent and have been published within the last decade. This make our findings
in the report ”state of the art”, something that is important when studying such a fast changing
subject as the ICT industry.
Since our subject is of a very wide nature we have been forced to use a framework in our
material collection process. We decided to use Bearing Consulting’s risk categories, presented in
section 2.5, to structure our work and to help the reader understand the presentation of material
in the material chapter. The material collection was conducted during four weeks and is to be
seen as the core of this report. Our analysis and our conclusions are based on this material and
we believe that the material is comprehensive and relevant. The hardest problem we faced in the
collection process was how to determine when we had enough material. We solved this by starting
in one risk category, and when the data we found started to correlate we went on to the next risk
category. When we had gone through all categories we summarized our findings, shown in figure
3.1 as the arrow back from material summary to material collection, to see where we needed to
focus in order to make our material comprehensive. We have also numerous times during our
work discussed our material with our tutor at the university and with experienced consultants at
Bearing Consulting, which at one point led us to the conclusion that we had good and sufficient
material to go on to the next step in the thesis process.
3.5 Analysis methodology
When enough material had been collected it was summarized into one single list. This list can
be found in Appendix A and include a column with all risks that could be extracted from the
material. The risks were extracted by going carefully through our material and step by step
note the risks that are present there. The reader may not fully understand the different risks as
they are presented in the appendix, since they for practical purposes had to be described very
briefly. The important thing is that the reader understands the connection between the risk list
and the material chapter. This list has then been used to connect business characteristics to
risk categories, in order to answer our research questions. The procedure will be explained more
throughly in the analysis chapter.
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3.6 Method criticism
Some critique can be directed at our material collection method. Firstly we realize that we during
the collection process might have been influenced by the material we found, but a complete
objectiveness is never possible. We had limited knowledge about the subject when the work
started; something that might mean that single articles subconsciously may have influenced us
to a large extent. On the other hand, the fact that there are two of us doing the research
would decrease this effect. Also we realize that there is a risk that articles we find refer to
other similar articles, and that we end up in a circle of similar articles written within the same
discourse excluding contradictory research. Since we have limited our research to fit into Bearing
Consulting’s risk categories we might also have excluded risks that lay outside the model. The
reader must have this in mind when reading this thesis, that our research might have returned
other results if it would have been conducted under different circumstances.
On a concluding remark, during our work and the more informed we got about non-financial
risk, the more obvious the need for a holistic perspective became. All risks in one way or another
seem to relate to other risks, and studying single risks in isolation seems inadequate since risks
seem to interact in a complex way. Actions taken to reduce the risk in one part of the business
might increase the risk in another part. Risks are never constant but vary over time; mega-trends
such as the growing awareness of the global climate crisis might influence company risk in very
unpredictable ways. This insight further assured us that we need to look at the subject from a
broad perspective, using various sources from various research discourses. We did not only wish
to look at the risks from a economic perspective, but also from for example an environmental and
political perspective that in the short perspective did not have any direct economic results for the
individual business. The authors behind such articles are likely to have a different perspective on
things, and by triangulating sources by authors with different backgrounds we hope that we can
give a wider perspective than the current most influential financial paradigm gives.
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Chapter 4
Material
This chapter contains a summary of the reports we have read and various risks are described and
placed under the risk categories that we borrow from Bearing Consulting’s risk analysis model.
Some risks are hard to categorize since they might fit under multiple labels. All categorization
is made subjectively by the authors. Some larger categories have subheadings to simplify for the
reader.
4.1 Market risks
The collected material concerning market risks are divided into subsections dealing with strategies,
globalization, research and development, network of actors and market characteristics.
4.1.1 Strategies
When assessing general market risks for the ICT industry we find that risks vary with the age of
the firm. Our findings suggest that, for service companies within the ICT industry, the strategies
of highest relevance are those that aim at the companies’ early post-entry stages in their develop-
ment. The strategies at this development stage should provide means for widening the companies’
product portfolios and increase the level of product versioning in order for the companies to be
able to stay competitive and to stay in business [32, 70]. The importance of above strategies in
software companies’ early development stages are verified by Lee and Lee[55], who also add that
there is an increased risk of company failure if the early strategies concentrate on low price which
demands high volumes, or if the strategy is unclear, e.g. a mixture between different strategies.
The case is similar for manufacturing ICT companies according to Kazanjian[48] who points out
the importance of strategic positioning on the market in a company’s early development phase
while the strategy should be oriented towards sales and marketing as companies grow. In later
stages of company growth, the strategy for staying competitive and enabling further progress is
once again to be focused on market positioning[48] but also on the possibility to obtain external
support[55]. The need for external support or co-operation is explained by Lee and Lee[55] to be
that large companies are significantly more affected by market influences.
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4.1.2 Globalization
Esteve-Perez et al.[29] studied data from 2028 manufacturing firms with the purpose to deter-
mine the factors of firm survival. Their study provides evidence that firms that actively advertise
themselves on the open market and manufacture firm-specific products together with necessary
research and development (R&D) are more likely to become successful. The study also shows
that companies that are internationally oriented with a large proportion of export sales are more
likely to survive than domestically oriented companies. This is assumed to be the reason why
international markets are more competitive and companies that can manage high levels of com-
petitiveness also are more likely to survive. Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson [70] take the discussion
about the importance of international market interaction a few steps further. They conclude their
study about market strategies in the ICT sector by stating that ICT companies, independent of
business goals, need to globalize or they will be outrivaled by international competitors. The
reason comes from the industry’s changing macro environment, global customer base and general
industry globalization but also from the fact that for ICT companies to be able to develop and
increase the companies’ efficiencies, globalization is considered to be a necessity[90]. However,
globalization strategies for business activities do not come in standardized packages, thus the
managerial issues to solve are many and complex[70]. The result from the risk management in-
volved when companies are forced to globalize is therefore to the largest extent shaped by the
managers’ ability and approach towards dealing with risks. Being able to evaluate what business
activities and what marketing strategy to bring to the global market and what business activi-
ties to shut down is by Gabrielsson and Gabrielsson[70] the most difficult problem to solve when
establishing a global go-to-market strategy for ICT companies.
4.1.3 Research and development
Except the necessity for companies in the ICT industry to go global, there are also necessities
of ambitious and continuous R&D work and investments for staying competitive in the highly
technological and always shifting business environment[6]. By not doing so ICT companies are
risking their product portfolio to become outdated. Aoun et al.[6]therefore express the need for
investment as the only way for companies in the ICT industry to survive. Another market risk
factor for companies in the ICT industry is the rapidly changing and evolving market; companies
need to be able to adapt quickly. According to Aoun et al.[6] the service sector within the ICT
industry requires the most intensive investments but also the shortest adaptation times. The
investment behavior of the manufacturing sector of the ICT industry is also much higher than
the manufacturing sector of other industries.
4.1.4 Network of actors
The way in which ICT companies usually are organized together with their need of continuous
investments result in several market risks for potential investors. The network dependencies of
ICT companies (dependencies on other market actors) put companies at a risk of failure since
network effects demand several actors’ involvement[43]. A concern about network dependencies
are highlighted by Cleff et al.[15] who in a report from the Center for European Economic Research
reveal that about 15% of companies in the ICT industry are concerned about major companies’
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abuse of market power. The abuse of market power would negatively affect the competition and
could therefore constrain the important technological development. Schoder[82] further discusses
the combinational risk of the ICT market in terms of network dependencies and R&D investments
and states that risks consist of the insecurity of forecasting whether R&D investments will be
profitable or not in markets with strong dependencies. As a consequence of this, Schoder[82]
suggests that ICT companies should finance their necessary R&D development with equity funds
before debt. Hyytinen and Pajarinen[43] state in terms of investment financing that equity-
dependent ICT companies’ investments are less efficient than those financed by debt, while they
at the same time agree with Schoder[82] that equity must be considered the most appropriate
form of financing.
4.1.5 Market characteristics
Other market risks concerning some of the branches in the ICT industry are the high fixed costs
and the relatively low variable costs. This is for example the case for electronic circuit board
manufacturers. Development of these products are costly but the production, transportation and
after market costs are relatively low[86]. The risks occur when these high fixed investments are put
in an investment dependent environment which can make the continuous fixed costs unbearable
for the company[43]. However, risks from continuous research, innovation and development do
not only come from uncertainties to cover costs. An ever-changing market puts companies at
risk of not having access to accurate information about market trends, market development or
competition relationships[15]. For the same reason information about new technologies or best
practice methods can be difficult to obtain. Risks from an ever-changing market also affect
the customers’ tolerance and at the same time make the company dependent on the customers’
and media’s acceptance of the new product features[15]. The uncertainty of customer loyalty,
tolerance and acceptance makes the product demand difficult to estimate. About 15% of the
companies in the ICT industry explicitly state that it is the uncertainty in customers’ demand
that is constraining further innovation research [15].
4.2 Operational risks
The gathered material concerning operational risks are summarized in the parts of prerequisites
for operational success, network of actors, funding and size of operating company.
4.2.1 Prerequisites for operational success
Mendelson[62] has assessed a number of prerequisites that need to be addressed in order for
a company’s operations to be managed successfully. These prerequisites are considered to be
most important in firm growth and stability phases[48]. Since company operations in the ICT
industry are heavily dependent on human capital[48] inter-organizational knowledge sharing and
transparency are important factors. Other factors that need to be addressed are the importance
of knowing what to do with the shared information, implementing methods to assess and process
information and decide on how decision structures should function in order to speed up the
response time of decision making. Risk occurs when these prerequisites are not met which could
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result in ambiguous decision making, lowered efficiency[21] and reduced competitiveness[72]. The
positive contributions to the company’s success if these prerequisites are fulfilled, or vice versa
if not fulfilled, have a greater impact on companies in industries characterized by fast evolving,
dynamic environments, such as the ICT industry[62].
4.2.2 Network of actors
The market risks caused by dependencies on other actors primarily concern companies’ inability to
individually influence the demand of the product[43]. For example is the growth of a PC software
developer dependent on increased sales of PC’s and a semi-conductor producer is dependent on
that semi-conductors are being used in the production of new electronic products. Concerning
operational risks, companies organized in networks are found to run a lower risk of operational
failure since the network presence reduces the vulnerability to external threats[65]. A major
reason for this is the networks ability to gain, share and combine both physical and organizational
resources among the network actors[91, 89, 42, 45].
Companies in the ICT industry to a large extent use external contractors, outsourcing, to
perform different parts of the company’s operations. Outsourcing, especially to eastern Asia,
is so common that 99.5% of the manufactured ICT products in China is financed with foreign
capital[58]. Outsourcing of a company’s operations as a business strategy holds numerous risks for
the outsourcing company. Commonly stated risks are losing necessary competence[57], problems
with evaluating contract manufacturers (CM’s) and product qualities, problems with reversing
outsourcing decisions, cost uncertainties, risk of losing intellectual property (IP) and increased
dependency on foreign suppliers[8].
4.2.3 Funding
ICT companies rely more on equity than on debt to finance the companies’ operations[40, 5].
Due to the high level of uncertainty of R&D success, debt is explained to be a too expensive way
of financing R&D activites[5] or that it might not even be feasible to obtain[43]. High levels of
debt might indicate substantial interest costs in a R&D intense environment which could drain
a company’s internal funds[5]. R&D uncertainties increase the cost of external funds since the
choice of equity by companies to finance their operations puts the company at risk since equity is
partially gathered from external sources, such as Venture Capitalists (VC). Dependency of external
financial sources exposes companies to risks caused by macroeconomic changes that could lead to
variations in present VC’s willingness to invest further, the availability of other equity offerings
might be limited[43]. Sohaimi[84] encounters additional risk for ICT companies by having VCs
as the common form of external funding. According to Sohaimi the lack of VC’s knowledge
in the invested company’s core competence is the most likely area of conflict that affects the
company’s operational performance. Aoun and Hwang[6] agree with Sohaimi[84] that not having
enough knowledge about the invested company’s core competence constitutes increased risks with
investments in the ICT industry.
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4.2.4 Size of operating company
For the individual company, the size of the company itself can have an impact on the possibility
of survival. Dhawan[24] found that the risk of failure for small firms is higher than that of large
firms. Dhawan also found that that the profitability was higher in small firms than in large firms,
supporting the common trade-off statement between risk and profit. The reason behind these
findings is that small firms to a higher degree need to adopt more aggressive strategies, making
them more productive than their larger competitors but also more exposed to risks. Aoun and
Hwang[6] state that large firms have a considerable advantage towards smaller firms since their
investments are less time-dependent. Large firms can to a higher extent wait until more profitable
options are available. Small firms therefore need to be more accurate in each investment decision
since they are more exposed to external threats. In a study conducted by Psillaki et al.[75] they
conclude that there is no significance between firm size and the risk of firm failure, but in this
case firm size was based on the company’s sales and not on staff size. Also Aoun and Hwang[6]
state that small companies are able to compete against larger companies because of their quick
responsiveness to the evolving market, characteristics that are less common in larger companies.
4.3 Technology risks
The collected material concerning technology risks are divided into the subcategories R&D and
innovation, knowledge tied to individuals and funding.
4.3.1 R&D and innovation
The ICT is a very technology intensive sector and many products are a direct result from various
research projects, both conducted at businesses and universities around the world. In many
countries, among them Sweden and Finland as well as the European Union as a whole, the ICT
industry constitute the largest amount of business research and development[33]. Research show
that ICT companies in all growth stages with intensive R&D work and differentiated technology
strategies perform better and have a reduced risk of business failure. The same correlation is
established from technological cooperation where companies that cooperate with outside institutes
also run a lower risk of business failure[55, 29]. What on the contrary increases the risk of failure
is if companies have few legal patent rights or if the top management crew is recruited from
other companies and hence are not familiar with the company’s technological core competence.
To reduce the level of risk, technological management competence should therefore be recruited
internally.
Esteve-Perez and Manez-Castillejo[29] state that in the highly innovative environment of
high-technology industries, the key to survival is to take the lead in the innovative process.
Mendelson[62] however found no statistical evidence that higher R&D intensity would generate
a better business result. Mendelson based his study on the statistical relationship between R&D
expenses and business result. The result reflected on the investing business is unknown and
therefore are the uncertainties of getting a return on the investment from R&D activity very high
[33].
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4.3.2 Knowledge tied to individuals
Research and development is to a large extent dependent on the knowledge of specific individuals.
Aoun and Hwang[6] talk about high adjustment costs when describing the R&D characteristics of
the ICT industry. High adjustment costs means that highly educated work forces are expensive
and the costs due to hiring and rehiring this type of work force are very high. The high costs come
from high salaries and that even highly educated experts need long and expensive on-site training
and firm-specific knowledge in order to contribute to the R&D. A company’s knowledge base is
formed by individuals’ knowledge and is lost if those individuals leave the company. Even worse
is that firm-specific individual knowledge easily can end up at competitors when individuals are
fired. Those factors contribute to the risk involved in R&D and affect the companies possibility
to acquire external funding for technical development.
4.3.3 Funding
Not having enough funding for development is a critical factor for ICT-companies. In a study
conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research it is stated that about 24% of the com-
panies in the ICT-industry have difficulties with their innovation because of insufficient funds[15].
The result of insufficient funds is often delays in product introduction or that companies stop
working with the costly but crucial continous technological development. Therefore is cost and
lack of financing the most common barriers from conducting research and development, as per-
ceived by ICT companies[15]. When starting a research initiative it is most often impossible to
tell if or when the initiative will be profitable. Because of that, many smaller companies, that
might have trouble funding the research they need, may not be willing to take the risk involved in
innovation projects[15]. On the other hand, Aoun et al.[6] conclude that larger companies might
be hindered in their innovation process due to the inertia that comes with increased organizational
size.
4.4 Total Quality Management
The collected material concerning total quality management are divided into the subsections
product quality and business quality.
4.4.1 Product quality
There are several risks associated with inferior product quality for a company. Except the obvious
risk of losing market shares due to products not fulfilling the customer demands there are specific
risks depending on the nature of individual companies.
It is common today that companies outsource their software production both domestically
and globally with a booming software market in low-wage countries such as India and Russia as a
result[52]. The quality risks that rise with this development are many. Unexpected work related
to testing and correcting software deficits that do not meet the quality specifications, or worse,
do not fulfill the required quality due to lack of quality specifications, may delay whole projects
and bring large costs[47]. Also, end products with quality problems may lead to legal claims from
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the customers due to the harm that software errors inflict on an organization[37]. Similar risks
arise in hardware producing companies. Contract manufacturers (CMs) take larger and larger
responsibility in the hardware development process, including production, design, research and
development, from the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs)[7]. Because of this, quality
issues that are important to the end customer may not be forwarded to the developer so that the
developer can do the needed changes. Also incentives that can be used to increase quality may
be missing in the contract between the CM and OEM. Why would a CM work hard to increase
quality on the products they make if they are not rewarded for that work? Kaya and O¨zer[47]
identifies two factors that increase risk in the outsourcing relationship: ”First, the CM and the
OEM may not be able to contract on quality; second, the OEM may not know the cost of quality
to the CM”.
4.4.2 Business quality
The mindset towards and level of internal business quality depend on various factors. Research
by Mann and Kehoe[59] concludes that larger companies generally put more effort into quality
work; less than 15% of companies with fewer than 300 employees have an active total quality
management program, to be compared with over 30% of companies with more than 300 employees.
They also determine the most important factor behind increased quality to be the mindset and
attitude towards quality from the board, trade union, employees and middle management.
In their studies on the relationship between product quality and business performance, Kroll et
al.[53] see several positive outcomes from increased quality. Companies with high quality products
may reduce their variance in returns, making them less vulnerable to both macroeconomic forces,
such as business cycles and firm and industry specific factors, that only hit certain industries but
not the whole economy. Better quality result in a larger market share and reduced direct costs
leaving low quality companies struggling.
4.5 IT, Security and Support Systems
A large risk for technology companies is the theft of intellectual property. The success of an
ICT company often depend on their level of innovation and technology, hence the importance to
safeguard it’s intellectual property from outside actors[43]. This is also an issue when considering
business partners or possible companies to merge with; the risk of intellectual property theft in
for example China may cause companies to avoid investment[60]. This is of specific interest in
the ICT-industry since the products most often are easy to imitate and reproduce[43]. The risk
concerning knowledge sharing and intellectual property with contract manufacturers affects both
the contracted and the contracting part. Contract manufacturers usually cooperate with several
competing clients, creating a risk that firm-specific information can end up in the wrong hands.
Risks with knowledge sharing of intellectual property also creates a risk that the contracted
manufacturer will ignore rules and regulations and instead adopt the knowledge for competing on
the market with its own products[7]. Risks also occur for the contracted that accidently can leak
information about its processes through the close cooperation and therefore make itself useless to
the client since the client now have the proper information for developing in-house instead[87].
The risk of intellectual property theft with contracted manufacturers in for example China hinders
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the development of the production sites since clients are not willing to share new high-technology
production solutions with actors in areas where intellectual property regulations are weak[58].
4.6 Human Resources
If the intention behind the M&A is to capture firm specific technology, which is very common in
the ICT industry, the risks in HR increases. A change of business culture in the target firm may
cause key personnel to leave the company and in the worst case join competitors. Firm integration
is a key element in all M&A activity and especially when the personnel is the main driver[12].
The importance of human capital in the ICT industry in order to keep specific knowledge within
the firm is further emphasized by Kazanjian[48].
4.6.1 Top management
Extensive research has been made on the impact from composition and size of the top management
team on business performance. Hambrick and D’Avenis[36] studied the importance of a stable top
management team by looking at large bankruptcies and concluded that there is a negative spiral
between top management deterioration and business deficiencies. Other studies have shown that
businesses with larger top management teams perform better over time. In young ventures, studies
show a positive relationship between a lower average age of the top management team and business
success. Younger executives on the other hand tend to take higher risks than older executives[66].
In a study by Lee and Lee[55] the most important risk factor in the management structure of
failed newly started technolgy-based ventures is the education level of the entrepreneur, where
lower education level more often lead to business failure.
4.6.2 Business culture
Several articles mention the business culture compatibility between companies to be an important
factor in a merger or acquisition. O’Reilly[67] acknowledges business culture to spring from the
motivation of people and the tendency to work for a common goal. Miller[64] mentions estimations
that mismanagement of cultural issues contribute to 85% of the failed mergers through cooperation
issues between companies. Schein[81] agree on this in his book and describes how the present
global business landscape with mergers and acquisitions make it vital for companies to be able
to work across cultural borders. He describes business culture as something that does not only
exist within individual employees but come into life when people are put together in a social
context. When people are put together in a new group they together form a culture based on
the members’ personalities and backgrounds and Schein describe this as an ”interplay of culture
creation, reenactment, and reinforcement [that] creates an interdependency between culture and
leadership”[81]. In order to create an efficient organization after a merger or acquisition it is
important that leaders understand the local culture and manage to align subcultures toward a
common objective.
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4.7 Environmental risks
Several reports have highlighted the alarming conditions in the Asian waste electrical and elec-
tronic equipment (WEEE or e-waste) recycling[58, 76, 88]. Rich industrialized countries that
produce the largest amount of WEEE export the waste to less developed countries in Africa and
Asia[76]. The electronic waste levels are rapidly increasing; in 2004, by estimation, about 100
million PCs became waste[88]. Also the production of ICT equipment is a severe burden to the
environment. In their report on energy and material use in the production process of microchips,
Williams et al. (2002) conclude that the semiconductors make for a disproportional amount of
resource use compared to the economical value they create. This high amount of consumed en-
ergy, water and material contributes to the pollution of land and water through its waste, as well
as emissions of green house gases such as carbon dioxide.
Pucket and Smith[76] describe the rich western countries’ e-waste strategy, exporting the waste
to less developed countries, as a ”convenient escape valve” and about ”exporting the [waste] crisis
to developing countries of Asia”, all to be ”a dirty little secret of the high-tech revolution”.
The e-waste contain valuable material such as gold (about 4 g in a regular PC) that can be
recovered for profit, especially in countries with low wages[39]. This makes the current e-waste
situation lucrative for companies in such countries, doing large damage to both the workers and
the surrounding environment.
To fight this development, the European Union is implementing a concept called extended
producer responsibility (EPR). This make the producer of each product responsible for dealing
with waste issues both upstream in the supply chain, in the production process and after the
product hit the market[22]. The purpose of this is to create incentives for the producers to create
more environmentally sustainable products in order to reduce costs when their life ends[80]. If
this issue is not considered at the design phase of the products, there is an obvious risk that
unforeseen costs regarding the recycling occur.
4.8 Code of conduct
Most code of conduct issues in the ICT industry regard conditions at outsourced services mainly
in Asia. In the ICT hardware sector, the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to a large
extent outsource the actual production to contract manufacturers (CMs) that employ far more
people than the OEMs[83]. Outsourcing reduces the OEMs’ control of their production activities
and may also reduce the responsibility taken. Numerous reports describe problems at factories in
the ICT hardware field ranging from worker’s health, excessive work hours and wages lower than
minimum allowed[58, 83]. In addition to these work oriented misconducts there are also frequent
report about workers refused the right to form unions, and there are also reports of dismissal of
employee spokespeople[14, 58].
Not much research has been made on the level of corruption in companies within the ICT
industry. Transparency International[44] report that corruption levels within the software and
services sector is the lowest among all sectors, but the semiconductor and technical hardware and
equipment production sectors show higher corruption levels.
The above misconducts risk both loss of good will and law suits.
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4.9 Political risks
There are several institutions providing international political risk ratings for individual coun-
tries that is used both when conducting due diligence and to base research on. One such service
commonly used by researchers is the International Country Risk Guide by the PRS group. The
political risk rating is made subjectively by using available material to answer questions about
factors influencing political risk such as government stability, socioeconomic conditions, internal
and external conflicts, religious and ethnic tensions and corruption[34]. Several studies has been
made on the stock price reaction and the stock return in connection with foreign direct invest-
ments (FDI) and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Those studies show that political risk
significantly affect both the stock price and returns[49, 25]. Diamonte et al.[25] also show that
political risk plays a more significant role on returns when investing in emerging than in devel-
oped markets. The difference, according to them, is as much as 11 percent difference in return
per quarter in favor to investments made in low risk emerging markets than in high risk emerging
markets, and 2.5 percent different in mature markets. A particular factor that increases the risk in
FDI and M&A is the level of corruption since it produces bottlenecks, heightens uncertainty and
raises costs. Corruption may also disturb the market mechanism by prohibiting market entry[35].
The corruption risk increases when the difference in country corruption level of the acquirer and
the acquired increases; the two parties simply do not know how to deal with each other[35].
There is also an inverse relation in political risk where the acquirer or investor contributes to
increase the political risk by making an investment. According to the UN, mining and smuggling
of coltan ore, from which the important electronic equipment metal tantalum is extracted, helped
finance the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In 2001 the electronics industry was
accused of indirectly financing these activities and thereby indirectly contributing to the war[58].
The material in this chapter describes the risks that are the most observed in the scientific
research about the subject. All material has been reviewed and the individual risks that are
mentioned in the text have been identified and collected into a list, presented in Appendix A. It
is on this list of risks that the following analysis is based.
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Chapter 5
Analysis
In this chapter we analyze the collected material and answer the research questions. To simplify
for the reader we have chosen to go through the analysis process step by step so that it hopefully
will be clear what decisions we have done and what findings we have made. In the first section we
will start with answering research question one by identifying the business characteristics that lie
behind or cause the different risks that we have extracted from the material. The second step is
to categorize the risks into the categories that Bearing Consulting use in their risk model. With
this done, we have created a risk pattern that shows what business characteristics that cause what
kinds of risks, and from that we can decide what we believe are the most important sources of risk.
5.1 Answering research question 1: Identifying the business char-
acteristics that cause the identified risks
In order to make an analysis possible we had to condense our collected material into something
more manageable. From the material based on 54 scientific articles we have therefore extracted
61 specific and relevant risks. Those risks have been collected into a list, which can be seen in the
middle column of appendix A.
The goal of this first step in the analysis is to find out what business characteristics that make
these risks arise. We want to find out what parts of a business, what business characteristics, that
make companies vulnerable. To do this we study the risk list in appendix A as well as the articles
that the risks are originally presented in and identify what the authors mean cause the risks. For
example, some articles study how risks arise as a company grows. Risks from such research have
been assigned the business characteristic business phase, meaning that the main thing that make
this risk arise is the phase of growth that a company is in. Other such characteristics can for
example be the geographic location or if the company produce physical products or not. All 61
risks are analyzed in this way, and the business characteristics we find linked to the risks are also
presented in appendix A, in the left column. Sometimes the decisions are not easy; we have to
make some generalizations not to make too many different business characteristics. We base this
categorization on the material instead of making own subjective decisions, which we believe result
in a better analysis that is more accurate with regard to the original research.
All 61 risks are tied to one or several business characteristics. A risk can for example be a
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cause of not only one business characteristics but a combination of two or more. Throughout
the categorization process we have to balance between functionality and comprehensibility: a
too detailed categorization would create too many business characteristics to make any analysis
meaningful, while at the same time too few characteristics would take the edge off the analysis and
make it too general. For example we have one characteristic called Market strategy that contain
both product portfolio and sales and marketing strategy, since we believe those characteristics in
this context are similar enough to be regarded as one.
When this first step of the analysis is done we see distinct patterns of what business charac-
teristics that cause risk. After discussions we have defined ten different characteristics that are
relevant to the proceedings of the analysis work. Those are: firm size, business phase, governance,
market strategy, funding, innovation process, network dependencies, outsourcing, product prop-
erties, market strategy and geographical location. Each one of them are described in more detail
below.
5.1.1 Firm size
Firm size is simply the size of the business. Businesses of different sizes are exposed to different
kinds of risk. This can for example be differences in profitability, decision making time and
processes and the availability of capital.
5.1.2 Business phase
All companies go through different growth phases in their life. Starting as a new venture and
eventually growing into a well established mature company. Risks can be associated to the phase
of which a company is in, for example initial uncertainties of the market acceptance of the product
that a company offer or insufficient support during the establishing phase.
5.1.3 Governance
Governance is a popular term that is frequently used in today’s management literature. In
our case we define this as a company’s top management’s ability to steer the company through
monitoring and control of its own and its partner’s interests. This can be seen as how well the
top management understands the surrounding and what expectations there are on the company,
both from the market and its different stakeholders. The business characteristic that we call
governance includes the top management’s market awareness and ability to make change as well
as how the top management enable knowledge sharing within the organization.
5.1.4 Market strategy
Under this label we have put all risks that deal with how a company plans on acting on the
market. This could for example include how a company positions itself on the market or how
well its products fit with what the market wants. The difference between market strategy and
governance is that governance describes how to act when in a certain position, while market
strategy deal with planning and strategy.
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5.1.5 Funding
Under this label we put all issues regarding how a company acquire the capital it needs to be
successful. Funds can come from different sources such as venture capitalists or banks, and
depending on what kind of funding a company use different risks arise.
5.1.6 Innovation process
Innovation process is a term that we use to describe the activities included in the research and
development activities. The technical and innovation level of the ICT-industry make this busi-
ness characteristic interesting, and risks arise from the never ending need to update the product
portfolios. The result of an expensive innovation process can never be known beforehand and the
market may react in different ways to the outcome.
5.1.7 Network dependencies
The complex nature of the ICT-industry creates a situation where corporate risks are not only
caused by the company itself, but arise from its surroundings. There is an eco-system of actors
that companies in the industry have to interact with, actors such as suppliers, wholesalers and
manufacturers throughout their entire value chains. Risks arise when companies become depen-
dent on other actors; they are no longer able to independently deliver their products to their
customers. If the cooperation with those actors for some reason would not work anymore, the
company would not be able to continue its activities. But risks may also arise from actors outside
a company’s value chain. For example, a single company in the ICT-industry can seldom control
the demand of its product itself but are dependent on how well other products sell. This is ex-
tra common in the ICT-industry where each product often is only one small part of a technical
system.
5.1.8 Outsourcing
This business characteristic is linked to risks that arise due to a company’s decision to let an
outside actor carry out certain business activities. Those actors can be based in the same or in a
foreign country. It is common in the ICT industry that companies outsource their production to
low-cost countries such as China and other Asian countries.
5.1.9 Product properties
Different risks arise depending on what kind of product a company produces. During the analysis
process we can see distinct differences between companies making goods and services. Risks that
arise depending on if companies make physical or non-physical products are tied to this business
characteristic.
5.1.10 Geographical location
Risk levels depend on in which country or between which countries a deal is made. Typical risks
tied to this category are political, such as the stability of the surrounding, and code of conduct
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issues regarding corruption.
The business characteristics that we have described above are the answer to our research
question one and will be used in the remainder of the analysis chapter.
5.2 Answering research question 2: Identify the most important
sources of business risk and map a risk pattern
Now when we know what business characteristics that are the most important factors to corporate
risks we want to go on with investigating if there is a pattern between them and if some of the
characteristics can be considered more interesting than others.
5.2.1 Categorizing the risks
To start with we want to categorize the 61 risks in appendix A based on what kinds of risk they
cause. To do this we have once again used the categories in Bearing Consulting’s risk assessment
model from section 2.5. All risks have been analyzed one by one and placed into the most suitable
category. Some risks span over more than one suitable category and have hence been placed in
several categories. As an example of this, the risk of losing intellectual property has been judged
to be both a technical and an operational risk. The categorization of risks can be seen in the
right column of appendix A.
When all risks have been categorized it becomes obvious that a large part of the risks we have
identified fall under the categories market, operations and technology. This can be interpreted in
different ways. Since we have based our work on existing research material the case may simply
be that those areas may more often be the focus of research, hence there is more material to be
found about those three categories. The popularity of some areas might depend on more academic
prestige or research trends. There is a chance that we unconsciously focused on those areas during
our material collection, and that we happened to find more material regarding them. But the
most likely explanation why we found so many risks connected to the market, operations and
technology categories are that those are central to businesses, that they in turn might contain
risks connected to various categories. For example, quality and security risks can quite suitable
be categorized as technology and operation risks, respectively. The categorization of risks is
sometimes hard, where does the border go between environment, political and code of conduct
risks? Should inadequate working environment be treated as a code of conduct or environmental
risk? Or maybe even a HR risk?
Our result may be seen as a way to legitimate Bearing Consulting’s model, since all risk
categories in the model have been found in the collected data. Earlier research has already shown
this and the model is already, with slight modifications, business praxis.
5.2.2 Connecting the business characteristics with the risk categories
So, up to this point in the analysis chapter we have first identified ten business characteristics
that cause risks. Then, we have placed all risks into the risk categories. Now, we will connect the
business characteristics with the risk categories. If you for a last time look at appendix A, what
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we want to do in this step is to connect the business characteristics in the left column, through
the risks in the middle column, to the risk categories in the right column. This is done graphically
at first, by putting the business characteristics on the left side and the risk categories on the right
side, and then draw a line for each risk that connect them. For example, a risk belonging to the
market risk category might be caused by a company’s size. Then a line is drawn from the business
characteristic Firm size to the risk category Market risks. The pattern that arise when connecting
business characteristics to the risk categories are shown in figure 5.1 below. The thicker the lines
are, the more risks there are between a business characteristic and a risk category.
Figure 5.1: Risk pattern for the ICT-industry. The figure is deducted from appendix A. The boxes
to the left represent the left column in appendix A containing the business characteristics. The
boxes to the right represent the right column in appendix A containing the risk categories. The
lines in between represent the risks that link the business characteristics to the risk categories.
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Our primary finding from figure 5.1 is that it shows which business characteristics that influ-
ences the most risk categories. This can be seen by studying the spread and width of lines going
out from the business characteristics’ boxes. What we find here is that some business character-
istics connect lines (risks) with almost all risk categories. This finding make us believe that those
business characteristics are central and the more important sources of business risk, unlike some
other characteristics that do not seem to be of the same importance.
5.2.3 Selection of the most important business characteristics
If we focus on the left boxes in figure 5.1, we will see that some business characteristics seem to
cause both a large number of risks and that they are widely spread (they are linked to several
boxes to the right). We propose that an important source of risk can not only be identified based
upon the number of risks it causes, since we do not know the effect and probability of occurrence
for each risk. Hypothetically one single risk caused by one business characteristic may constitute
a bigger threat than the total threat from several other risks. We have already discussed the
fact that quantification of risks is impossible in this case, but what we can see is how spread the
risks are throughout an organization. Or in other words: what business characteristics that are
connected to several risk categories.
To easier illustrate this, we put the business characteristics and risk categories in a matrix, as
shown in table 5.2 below.
Figure 5.2: Table with risk spread over the risk categories
The numbers in the cells in table 5.2 represent the number of risks connected from the business
characteristics (in the column to the left) to the risk categories (in the top row). The cells are color
coded from green (no risks) to red (large number of risks) to give a better picture of the spread.
We see for example that the largest number of risks in a single cell is in the market strategy and
market risk interception (top left cell with nine risks). But based on our earlier arguments, this
does not make market strategy an important business characteristic, since there is no spread to
the other risk categories. We see that other business characteristics, such as outsourcing, have a
wider spread among several risk categories. The rightmost column in table 5.2 summarizes each
row, showing the number of combined risks that every business characteristic cause. We denote
this combined risks since this sum is larger than the number of risks caused by the business
characteristics. For example, we see that network dependencies cause only six risks in appendix
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A, while it causes eleven combined risks. This happens because one risk might be put in several
risk categories (more than one category in the right column in appendix A), making the combined
risk count larger for one single risk.
So why do we talk about this difference between combined risk and number of risks you may
wonder? Well, in figure 5.3 below we have plotted the combined risk sum with the sum of risks
caused by each business characteristic.
Figure 5.3: Illustration showing the risk spread of each business characteristic
Figure 5.3 show the number of risks that a business characteristic cause (light bars) and the
number of combined risks (dark bars). The different heights of the two bars indicates the spread
of risks between the different risk categories. This difference between the two bars is presented in
figure 5.4 below, to further illustrate this effect.
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Figure 5.4: Extraction of the risk spread of each business characteristic from figure 5.3
Taking the spread shown in table 5.2 and the height of the bars in figure 5.4 into account, we
conclude that the most important business characteristics that cause risk for companies in the
ICT industry are governance, innovation process, network dependencies and outsourcing.
To further explain those four business characteristics we have made four short cases that
hopefully will make the reader fully understand what typical risks they may create.
Mini-case: Governance
Governance is all about companies’ ability to ”breathe and feel” the changes of the market. The
AOL Time Warner merger is a famous case that clearly illustrates that not being aware of
changing market conditions can have a critical outcome.
In the year 2000 the American Internet service and media company AOL merged with the
entertainment and media conglomerate Time Warner in the history’s most valuable merger,
US$183 billion[31]. The deal was cleared by the Federal Trade Commission in 2001. Around
year 2000-2001 it was quite a ride in Internet industries and the actors involved were in for a
thrill. In 2002, a year after the merger was finalized AOL’s profit started to decrease. At the
same time Internet companies’ market valuations were questioned and specifically the value of
AOL Time Warner. By the end of 2002 the value of the company had dropped dramatically and
AOL Time Warner reported the largest loss of an individual company in history, US$99 billion
one year after the merger was finalized[2].
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Mini-case: Outsourcing
A typical fear with outsourcing to CMs is the loss of control and competence and the empow-
erment of the CM to evolve into a market share stealing competitor. This is something that
General Electric learned first hand.
In the 1980’s there were four major producers of micro-wave ovens on the global home appliance
market, Japanese Matsushita, Sanyo and Sharp and American GE. GE experienced a market
share drop in relation to their competitor since the Japanese producers were able hold a signifi-
cant lower retail prize for their micro-wave ovens. GE took a bold decision at the time and closed
down their factory in Maryland, USA, and instead outsourced the production of their ovens to
a small unknown Korean producer. The contracted Korean producer had almost no available
technology, no prior knowledge in the field, no modern production facilities and no established
distribution channels. The Korean producer initally got the necessary knowledge from visiting
GE engineers and the production was eventually successful. GE could now be a contestant of
the price-pressing contest once again. However, the Japanese competitors were markets leaders
with huge production possibilities which eventually resulted in GE’s capitulation from the mar-
ket. The small unknown Korean producer however, now had enough technical skill and facilities
to start producing ovens under their own brand, and so they did. A few years later the little
unkown producer, today named Samsung, was the world’s largest producer of micro-wave ovens
[27] that competes with GE in many different markets.
Mini-case: Innovation process
In the innovation demanding environment that characterizes the ICT industry it is of highest
importance to continue investing in innovations in order to survive. Innovations can be generated
from within the own organization or be acquired from other companies. For the investment to
be financially successfull it is in both cases important to evalutate what the customer benefit and
consequently the customer demand is.
Ebay may have over-estimated the customer benefits when trying to innovate the e-commerce
industry in 2005. Ebay acquired the Internet-based telephone company Skype for a dazzling US
$2,6 billion in an attempt to provide VOIP services for e-commerce customers. What happend
was that the customer benefits that were realized from the innovation were not of interest for
Ebay’s customers, e-mail worked just fine. Ebay eventually admitted that the prize tag of the
innovation attempt was too high, but that didn’t reflect the stock prize much since most stock
analysist already knew that. This costly attempt to innovate their business has been referred
to as one of the worst deals in the history of the PC industry. In 2009 sources said that Ebay
is trying to find a buyer for Skype[17, 4, 11].
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Mini-case: Network dependencies
When investing in companies in the ICT industry one should be well aware of that the targeted
company’s faith is in the hands of other actors. ICT companies are strongly dependent on other
actors in their own value chain but also on other value chains, hence neither their demand nor
supply of products can be fully controlled by themselvs.
The faith of the Swedish software developer UIQ was in 2009 decided by the three major mobile
phone producers Nokia, Motorola and Sony Ericsson. Sony Ericsson and Motorola each owned
a 50 percent share of UIQ while Nokia was excluded from the value chain of UIQ’s products.
Sony Ericsson and Motorola had an interest in UIQ since they used UIQ’s developed platform
(based on Symbian OS) in their mobile phones. The actors’ behavior that followed had severe
consequences for UIQ. Nokia bought all shares in Symbian and turned the operating system into
a free open-source software for anyone to use. The purpose was to neutralize symbian based
platforms as a competitor and to gain functions that could be added to their own platform (the
S60). Motorola didn’t follow through on its commitments to use UIQ’s platform in models to
come and Sony Ericsson shifted to use Windows Mobile. After the desertion, UIQ’s CEO said
”we got into a position where we have no customers, no product to sell, and therefore no income
either” and ”there are no opportunities to create a new line of business in the current financial
climate”. After decisions made and actions taken from actors both in the same value chain and
in other value chains, UIQ filed for bankruptcy and about 200 employees had to go job searching
[68, 73, 10].
If we extract all other business characteristics from figure 5.1 than the ones identified as the
most important, we end up with figure 5.5. When we study the spread of those risks we see that
those four business characteristics in combination together influence all risk categories but one.
This is political risk, which in figure 5.1 is only connected to a company’s geographical location.
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Figure 5.5: Risk pattern for the ICT-industry with the four most important business character-
istics
The four business characteristics that we have identified as the most important are in many
ways central to companies in the ICT industry. Companies need to keep a high innovation level
or order to compete on the technical and ever changing market. A single company rarely makes a
complete product or solution which creates an unavoidable dependence between actors in the ICT
industry, making network dependencies an important business characteristic. Also outsourcing is
a central term in the ICT industry where producers of both goods and services outsource different
parts of their organization to other actors. It is also of course of great importance that companies
know what is happening in this global and complex marketplace and that they are able to react
to changes, constituting the base of governance which therefore also is an important business
characteristic.
Innovation process, network dependencies, outsourcing and governance, in our opinion and
with support from our material, make for the business characteristics that should be extra carefully
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examined during the due diligence process in connection to an investment or M&A activity.
5.3 Similarities between the identified business characteristics
After identifying the four most important business characteristics, the next step in the analysis
process is to see if they have anything in common that can explain why they are special. It is
obvious that all four concern things that a company cannot, or only to some extent, control.
Both before and during an innovation process the outcome is very hard to judge and control.
Adding the fact that innovation work is very expensive but yet vital to a company’s survival in
the technology dependent ICT industry, make the uncertainties in the innovation process even
more crucial. We also believe that the same things apply to network dependencies. Knowing
how a complex market will develop, how consumers will react and how other, not necessarily
rational, actors will behave creates uncontrollable network dependencies. The step is not long
to the outsourcing processes, also meaning that you put control of your business in the hands
of other actors that you do not have full control of. Governance is also tightly connected to the
same phenomenon, since it deals with understanding and controlling the company’s surrounding
environment.
But what really connect those four properties are that they all have arisen from the global-
ization of the economy. The ICT industry has both driven and been driven by the globalization
trend. The informations- and communications technology itself, together with safe and cheap
transportation of goods, has made it possible for companies to spread out around the world to
build new markets and production sites: the technological and political stability has created the
base for a global outsourcing economy. The world has become smaller in a sense, and more ac-
tors fight for the same space. A complex market that involve huge networks of actors, all with
internal relationships, has grown up and today no company in the ICT industry is an island
by itself. Looking at our four main business characteristics this is strikingly clear, they are all
related to this phenomenon. The risks in the innovation process that we have mentioned stem
from a global complex market where cooperation and technological partnerships and acquisitions
are necessities if a company intends to survive. Outsourcing has become more common due to
globalization when activities more easily can be transferred to other actors, both nationally and
internationally. It has created the possibility to reduce costs by outsourcing the production of
goods and services to low wage countries, something that is very common in the ICT industry.
The network dependencies are also a result from globalization since companies has become more
tangled up with each other resulting in that they can not independently control for example the
demand of their products, the supply of neccessary material or the access to market channels.
Governance is the companies’ ability to understand what is going on around it, an ability that is
of course more important the more a company depend on outside partners. A few decades back,
all important operations remained inside the same company and even within the same building,
making governance an easy task. Today when operations are spread out globally, just knowing
what is going on with the most vital parts of the company takes a lot of effort and skill.
This finding, that the globalization of the ICT industry is the driver behind many risks, is
interesting since it is a recent development. A vast majority of the material that was used in
this thesis is from the last decade and has hence been influenced by the globalization process,
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that is fairly young. Classic risk assessment literature mostly deal with internal risks, risks that
has arisen within the company. Such risks do of course still exist and must be considered, but
what this thesis show is that focus must be put also on external factors and risks that arise in
the relationship with other actors. Risk assessment must, due to the globalization process, evolve
and to a larger extent look at factors outside the company. We believe this is a new orientation
and that the last decades’ global development also need to be reflected in the risk assessment work.
Our findings are presented in figure 5.6 below, where typical questions for each business
characteristic are asked.
Figure 5.6: Illustration of the most important business characteristics
5.4 Are these results specific to the ICT-industry?
When putting together the collected material some market properties appear to be extra important
to the ICT-industry. Those all regard the fact that the industry the last decades have been
characterized by a strong growth, that the marketplace is extremely dynamic, global and that
different actors in the industry have strong connections to each other. Other characteristics of
the industry are the uncertain and global customer demand. The ICT industry is considered to
be the most dynamic and globally dispersed sector in the world economy[3], maybe because it
has driven the development itself with its information- and communication products. The ICT
industry is the forerunner in the global economy, but many other sectors follow its lead. This is
why we believe that our findings in this thesis, that the most important business characteristics
stem from the globalization process, will be applicable on other industries as well as soon as they
reach the same global status as the ICT industy has.
If the same research methodology that we have used in this thesis would have been applied
to another industry today, it is very possible that the result would have been different. Other
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business characteristics would most likely have been more important in influencing the risk level
of such companies, making up another kind of risk pattern. But if the same industry became
more globally dispersed and was reviewed again in the future, maybe the results will be similar
to the ones in this study.
5.5 About our working procedure
In the methodology chapter we discussed the problems with quantifying non-financial risks to a
comparable unit. This belief has been confirmed in several articles we have stumbled upon, as well
as in contact with professors from different universities. We discussed the possibility of translating
risks into monetary terms, but this is not possible in our case since we do not deal with a specific
case, but with a general industry, where certain parameters such as company size is impossible
to define. The specific interaction between acquired and acquirer might be of great importance,
something that cannot be studied on a general level. For example can risks that are critical to
one company be harmless to another. This problem with latent risks that are brought to light in
M&A activities are exemplified by the case of ABB acquiring Combustable Engineering presented
in the introduction chapter. The latent risks of Combustable Engineering became critical to ABB
as soon as the acquisition was signed.
When ranking risks to each other were not possible we had no choice other than treating them
all the same. But this approach is also troublesome, since it is sometimes hard to define what
can be seen as one risk or two risks. Different articles have different level of details, where one
might discuss the general market risk while another in great detail describe how different market
strategies influence different kinds of market risks. In addition, an unbalanced material collection
process could highly influence the number of different risks found, so treating them all the same
would still not give material reliable enough to draw any conclusions.
This is why we decided, as shown earlier in this analysis chapter, to look at the spread of risks.
The risks identified from the material should be regarded as a sample of risks, well representing
the different kinds of risks in the ICT industry. From this sample conclusions about different
business characteristics are drawn, conclusion that with high probability would have been the
same even if the risk sample would have been different.
During our work we have on several occasions discussed other possible categorization methods
of risks. The most interesting one has been the distinction between internal and external risks.
It seems like there are some risks that are both caused by and hit a single company in isolation,
risks that that company has to deal with alone. Then there are external risks, risks caused by
factors lying completely outside the company, factors such as political regulations or a behavioral
change of market leading actors. Such distinction between internal and external risks would have
been very helpful in the due diligence process, since it would show what risks the company should
deal with and correct itself. Unfortunately, our experiences from the work with this thesis have
shown that such distinctions are hard to make. The risks are connected in a complex manner
which figure 5.1 clearly shows. Internal and external factors interact and cause risks that are in
the borderland between them, hence it is very hard to separate internal from external risks for
companies in the ICT-industry. This lay well in line with our findings, that the most important
business characteristics causing risk do so because of the dependence between different actors.
43
Chapter 6
Discussion
In this chapter we will deal with some interesting questions that we stumbled upon during our work.
We will take one step back to discuss issues that are not directly tied to the research questions but
still must be dealt with to put the thesis and its findings in a relevant context. Our hope is that the
discussion further increases the readers understanding of the due diligence process in investment
and M&A activity.
6.1 Risk versus uncertainty and the quantification problem
In section 2.1 we discuss the difference between risk and uncertainty. We say that risks can
be used in mathematical calculations, both as probability of occurrence and as impact effect.
Uncertainties, on the other hand, can only be identified but not assigned a numerical value. The
due diligence process started as a purely financial risk assessment and has since been extended
to also include non-financial aspects. In the financial due diligence process risks are calculated
with quantified input parameters, such as key numbers and industry historic figures or other
data. Calculations result in probability and effect of risks, which are then used when making for
example investment decisions. But lately it has also become obvious that non-financial factors
play a big role and that they to a great extent affect the risk propensity of a company. With this
insight, it is of course attractive to transfer the due diligence process also to such aspects, but
this is not easily done. Non-financial risks are in their nature very hard to quantify, and hence we
claim that non-financial due diligence do not really deal with risks, but with uncertainties. The
due diligence vocabulary stem from the financial world, but when shifting field and moving more
into the field of organizational analysis, the expression risk is no longer really accurate.
Our findings, presented in the analysis, deal with uncertainties and not risk. Hence there is no
meaning in trying to quantify them. The material we have used is mostly built on interview based
aggregated research. Researchers have with their theories and hypotheses formulated questions
mostly to people in central positions in different companies. Those people has then subjectively
interpreted the researchers’ formulations and given answers to them based on their own analyses
of the situation. These analyses are of course colored by the respondent and its relation and
insight to its organization. The answers have then subjectively been interpreted by researchers,
once again with their theoretical background and frame of reference and have then, in some cases,
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been quantified so that statistical calculations can be made. We accept the relevance of such
research and agree that they might give a good picture of the reality. But that we, based on
this material with its many sources of uncertainty and error, would build a quantifiable model
concerning the uncertainties of a whole industry would not be believable. We cannot decide what
are the single most important risks since they are dependent on a specific context and do not deal
with the industry as a whole.
When subjective risk assessments are made an interesting and well-documented effect often
occurs. This effect make risks with low probability of occurrence but with big result if they
occur often overrated. Oppositely, common risks with a small outcome are often underrated. A
common example of this phenomenon is people being afraid of plane crashes or nuclear power
plant accidents, events that are very unlikely to occur but with catastrophic results. Few people
are afraid of driving their car or riding their bike, but those activities bring far higher risks. This
phenomenon within the field of risk perception has been studied by Lichtenstein et al.[56] and we
believe that this same phenomenon also may occur in the due diligence work where it might be
easy to see the large but less likely risks and neglect the smaller but more frequent risks. The
whole subjective risk assessment methodology put the classic risk mathematics out of play and
instead we are dependent on arbitrarily evaluating uncertainties of different kinds.
6.2 Business culture as a residual
Many reports that we have read name business culture as the most important factor behind failing
mergers and acquisitions. This is often formulated in vague terms with no reference to reliable
research. It is of course possible that the business culture is such an important aspect as those
authors claim, but we have so far not seen a definition of what such cultural aspects would include
and we believe that the culture concept often is used as a grouping of non-identified problems that
arise. Business culture becomes a residual that is convenient to use to describe the uncertainties
that cannot be placed in another suitable category. The fact that culture is treated as such an
important factor might say more about the understanding of the M&A process than about real
cultural problems. Starting a M&A process with the belief that 85% of failed mergers would be
due to cultural differences, as some researchers say[64], questions the relevance of doing a due
diligence at all. If you consequently blame the failure of mergers and acquisitions on incompatible
cultures, then you also discard the purpose of the due diligence since the meaning is to find the
real sources of failure.
6.3 Possible reasons behind mergers and acquisitions
It is known that approximately half of all mergers fail. Despite this the number of M&A attempts
increase every year. In the introduction chapter we present some common reasons behind mergers,
but we believe that the mainstream M&A literature might miss some aspects. Individuals might
see mergers as a way to gain legitimacy and respect as a step in accelerating its own career. The
ability to conduct a successful merger or acquisition is a highly coveted ability.
Another possible reason behind M&A activity could be to hide inconvenient problems or to
show that something is being done. If there are no other ideas, a company can always do a merger
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to show that some action is taken, just like downsizing or reorganization can be used. A merger
or acquisition could be a possible solution instead of dealing with the real problems within the
organization. And if the merger then fails, you can always blame business culture. Doing this the
top management can avoid being blamed for both bad results and a failed merger.
As a part in the M&A activity an outside actor is often contacted to evaluate the conditions
and uncertainties (the due diligence process). This actor has of course a limited time to gain
knowledge and insight about all different parameters in the process and its findings can in no way
cover all possible scenarios. But this report, made by experts, contributes in another important
way: it provides a proof that the merger or acquisition is possible. It gives the M&A legitimacy.
The report might only confirm the acquiring company’s gut feeling, but when it is printed on
paper it is real. This corresponds well to Meyer and Rowans’[63] theory about a company’s
facade as separated from its core. In the business climate it is important with a facade to show
competitors, customers and stakeholders that you are a modern and progressing company. Such
actions might in many cases just be a show or display more than something that in a real way
affect the daily work. The importance of this shiny facade might consciously or subconsciously
be used by the top management to motivate their actions.
With this said we do not in any way imply that mergers and acquisitions are meaningless, but
it is important to have in mind that the internal reasons behind the actions do not always have
to be the same as the ones that are presented to the outside.
6.4 Collision between academy and practice
During our work we have run into several obvious and interesting collisions between the academic
research and the practical due diligence field work. Those two different parts do often look at the
same issues from different perspectives. Bearing Consulting, for example, chose to quantify all
risks into bars in different heights in their risk assessment process (see figure 2.1) based on personal
experience and not on actual qualitative findings. We understand the pedagogical purpose of this
quantification and that it is a powerful tool to show the customer differences in risk between
different risk categories. It can also be seen as a way to win legitimacy, where bars that symbolize
risk are convincing and easy to accept as opposed to a written report, like the one you are reading
right now. The quantification is an excellent practical marketing and presentation tool that works
well on the field, but a scientist would most likely be more questioning to this approach since the
bars really does not mean anything else than ”take an extra look into this”.
This phenomenon points out the obvious perspective difference between academy and practice
that we have had to face during our work. Nothing says that the academic view is more correct,
it is just simply two different standpoints to look at the same thing from. We do not intend to go
deeply into some kind of discourse discussion since that would be outside the framework of this
report, but we still want to share our view on the obvious and necessary differences between the
practical field workers and the academic researchers. With an academic analytic view the field
work would be extremely limited, time consuming, hindering and more or less impossible. The
subject is too complex for pure scientific methodology to be effective; the work will to some extent
have to be based on personal experience and well-grounded subjective decisions. We have found
this collision between perspectives very interesting and it is obvious that the two sides have a lot
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to learn from each other. The people working on the field could pay some more attention to the
academic critically analyzing work procedure in order to legitimate its work and to discover other
rewarding activities than M&A. Decisions are seldom based on purely rational grounds but are
instead influenced by the social environment and the explicit and implicit industry wide trends
that shape the business landscape. Today’s truth in business is that mergers and acquisitions
create successful organizations, even though research show that more than half of them fail.
If the people on the field would blindly listen to the researchers there would hence be no more
mergers or acquisitions. Although M&A actitives have a high failure rate it can still be considered
to be necessary for a business ongoing success. We conducted a summary over companies within
the ICT-industy on the Global Fortune 500 list[16]. Out of 60 reviewed companies we have found
evidence that 59 companies sometime during their history have made a merger, an acquisition
or both. This proves that even if mergers and acquisitions are uncertain to succeed, they are
still necessary for companies to become large and successful enough to be listed on the Global
Fortune 500 list. Even if M&As are haunted by high failure rates, there are many such actions
made and we have shown that many of the most successful companies in the world have been
involved in M&A activity. There are also writers who question the correctness with the high
failure rate of M&A activity. Epstein[28] says that ”commonly used narrow interpretations of
merger success (such as 50% or 70% fail rate) undervalue the contributions of mergers, and that a
more comprehensive evaluation often leads to very different conclusions.” Either way, the conflict
between academy and practice is interesting and it illustrates the large gap between the parties.
Since the academy use a proof-based methodology, meaning that it should be possible to prove
all opinions and hypothesis, the situation gets extremely complex when moving into non-financial
sources of business risk. This complexity has been mentioned in several reports and is pointed
out as one reason why not so much research has been made on the non-financial or soft factors in
mergers and acquisitions. This further increase what we earlier discussed, that people working in
the field of risk assessment often have to base their work on subjective quantifications, since this
is the only known way of approaching the subject.
We have carried out the work with this thesis in close cooperation with both academy and
practice. When all academic material had been collected and discussed with Bearing Consulting
we found some differences in view between the two parties.
For example, Bearing Consulting expressed their belief that business risks in the ICT indus-
try vary depending on if the company’s actions are geared toward other businesses or to end
consumers, so called business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-consumer (B2C). Neither during
the material collection nor during the material condensation there has been any indication that
the risk levels would be different depending on what types of customers a company has. The
research seems to completely neglect this perspective. Possible reasons to this could be that there
has been no research in this field, that there are no differences in risk between the two types
of customers or that this kind of differentiation is included in what is labeled value chains, eco-
systems or actor networks. If more attention had been put on those different customer types in
the research, maybe our result would have looked different. Perhaps customer type should have
been one of our important business characteristics, but since we found no material regarding this
we cannot include it in this thesis. It would have been interesting, as a next step, to study other
industries than the ICT industry to see if there are any interesting similarities or differences and
if for example customer type would have been paid more attention to in those industries.
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Another difference between the academy and practice that we found regards the different
incentive programs that companies use and what happen to them when a company is acquired or
merged. It is for example impossible to keep an incentive program that gives the key personnel
the option to buy stock in the company, since an acquired company’s stock might be taken over
completely by the acquirer. If the incentive system has big differences regarding options and
bonuses compared to the acquiring company, a change is unavoidable. Bearing Consulting in
their daily practice see this as a big and common problem, when key personnel chose to leave
an acquired company due to incentive disagreements. This issue has not been dealt with in any
article we have come across, once again showing that there need to be communication between
the academy and practice so that research can be directed at the most interesting and important
spots.
6.5 Research alignment
One thing that hit us at the end of our material collection is that we found no conflicting studies
whatsoever. This is very surprising since there are so many sources of error when studying non-
financial risk, that some studies simply must have come to different conclusions. But this never
happened, and we have some theories that might explain this. One is that there simply is such a
limited amount of research material and that there are no conflicting conclusions simply because
there is not so much research that could collide. Another theory regard how material is presented
in search engines, such as article databases. We do not know how search engines are designed, but
we see an obvious risk that the results showing up first are the most popular and most referenced
to. This could be good, since the best articles are made available. But there is a risk that research
becomes aligned and that only the opinions and conclusions that agree with each other and the
perceived mainstream truth gets publicity. Any deviating research might be punished so that it
does not reach us.
6.6 Risks today and tomorrow
All our results that we have shown in the previous chapter are based on how the ICT industry
looks today, since all material that we have used is based on research on existing companies. It
means that the risk pattern that we have discovered will probably change when the conditions
and environment that companies act in change. If we are to look into the future there are some
indications on what might happen and what changes to business risk this might bring. The ongoing
globalization process could hopefully create a more positive situation in poor countries, where a
local wealth might be built on more work and better salaries when outsourcing of production
from the richer countries continues. This will hopefully lead to better conditions, which in turn
will bring well-grounded demands for better working conditions and environmental concern. To
meet those demands, the producers will need to take more responsibility about their products,
make them environmentally sustainable and take a more active part in the recycling process.
Producing companies, and in the end the consumer, might at last have to take responsibility
and fully pay for the harm that the luxury consumption of some technology inflicts. Tougher
demands will have to be put also on the ICT industry regarding sustainability and fair trade.
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Better insight into the problems throughout the whole value chain might force retailers of the
end product to control that no ethical violations has been made upstream in the value adding
process, for example in the Asian production facilities. The same demands that have been put on
for example the clothing industry will have to be put also on the ICT industry, to make sure that
there is complete transparency into the production processes and that working environmental
laws and human rights are met. The global environmental focus may make consumers no longer
accept products that do serious harm to the environment. Outsourced production processes will
eventually have to modernize to meet higher environmental demands, something that with time
could lead to increased production costs.
The supply of natural resources needed to produce material for technology products are lim-
ited, and can only be found in certain places of the world. The ICT industry has already been
blamed for indirectly financing the civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. When pro-
duction and consumption of such resources increase the need to further exploit some parts of the
world will rise further. How long will consumers in the rich world accept that the material used to
build their new technical and unnecessary toy has literally taken people’s lives in the poor world?
Historically we have seen similar developments in other industries, where for example the
popularity of the Fair Trade mark in the food industry is used to separate products that have
been produced in ethically acceptable and environmentally sustainable ways. Why can there not
be a Fair Trade mark for technology products that in so many ways violate the same things as the
food industry does? Such demands discussed above might come fast from both politicians and
the public and it is therefore vital that companies already today look over their code of conduct
issues both at themselves, their suppliers and their suppliers’ suppliers. Being a frontrunner in
those issues might even be a way of differentiating from other actors, making obvious and sound
ethical activity also financially attractive.
There may also be a future change in consumer behavior to a more sustainable position,
something that for example has already to some extent happened in the car industry. Huge cars
with strong, fuel guzzling engines have lost their prestigious position to smaller, fuel efficient
substitutes. This consumer move went against what a large part of the car industry was working
for, and showed that consumers can in a real way influence also the production focus of large
companies. A similar trend can be expected in the ICT industry when consumers no longer
accept waiting for the large companies to make the ethically right decisions.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
It is now time to look back on our research questions and see if we have been able to answer the
questions that we asked ourselves in the beginning of our work, and what other conclusions we
have drawn during the process of writing this thesis.
1. What general business characteristics are the sources of risks that arise in mergers and
acquisition activities in the information and communication technology industry?
The mapping of risks has convinced us that there are ten business characteristics that to a
large extent influence the risk propensity of a company. Those are described more thoroughly in
the analysis section and are presented in short in figure 7.1 below.
Figure 7.1: Business characteristics that are the most important sources of risk for ICT companies.
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2. Based on the answers from the first question, is it possible to create a risk pattern that
identify the most important sources of business risk in mergers and acquisition activities, and how
would such a pattern look like?
We have used our material to create a risk pattern for the ICT industry (see figure 5.1 in
the analysis chapter). From this pattern we have elevated four business characteristics that we
believe have a particularly importance for the upcome of risk. Those four are the innovation
process, outsourcing, governance and network dependencies. They all give rise to a large amount
of risks spread widely throughout the entire company. Why these four shoot out as important
factors in the due diligence is because they create uncertainties that a single company cannot
completely control itself, but stem from its interaction with other actors. We have come to the
conclusion that they all stem from the globalization process where the ICT industry is one of the
forerunners. More global operations put new demands on the assessment of risks and the last
decades’ development has lead to a situation where more effort need to be made on factors in a
company’s external eco-system. We believe that more industries will globalize and follow the ICT
industry’s lead, which with time will make the same approach we have proposed also interesting
in other industries.
Figure 7.2 below shows the four most important business characteristics and typical questions
that may have to answered in the assessment process of these.
Figure 7.2: The four most important business characteristics to investigate during risk assessment
in the due diligence process for ICT companies.
During the intensive months under which the thesis was written a complex world of risk
assessment has appeared. Above all it has become obvious that quantification of non-financial
risk is extremely difficult, something that many articles, researchers and professionals agree with.
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Therefore we have concluded that the risk assessment part of the due diligence process has never
treated risk, but uncertainties that by nature and definition are not possible to mathematically
calculate.
7.1 How can the results of this report be used?
The main conclusion that we make after indentifying our four main risk-causing business char-
acteristics is that there are no shortcuts to a good due diligence. The four characteristics all
deal with the interaction between companies in a global setting and all risks can hence only be
identified after a thorough assessment. It is not sufficient to only look at the single company in
isolation; also the interactions with other surrounding actors must be included. The due diligence
process must follow the global development and be widened to include larger analyses of the
surroundings where also external parameters should be regarded. Internal and external factors
interact, which makes both of them vital and rule out the option of neglecting any of them. Also
the same approach can be used in other industries that has reached the same global status as the
ICT industry.
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Appendix A
Table with risks
This table is the basis for our analysis and consists of three columns. The center column contains
a summary of all risks that we have identified from the collected material. In the left column
are the business characteristics that influence the upcome of those risks, based on the material as
well. The right column contains a subjective categorization of risks into the risk categories used
by Bearing Consulting, as explained in section 2.5.
Business characteristics Risks Risk categories
Market strategy, Business
phase
Focus on low price demanding high volumes Market
Market strategy, Business
phase
Too small customer segment Market
Market strategy, Business
phase
Mixture between different strategies Market
Market strategy, Business
phase
No strategic position on market Market
Market strategy, Business
phase
Insufficient external support Market
Market strategy Inability to build brand Market
Market strategy Too general product portfolio Market
Market strategy Limited to only domestic market Market
Governance, Market strategy Difficulties to enter global market Market
Innovation process Outdated product portfolio Market
Governance Inability to quickly adapt to a changing mar-
ket
Market
Network dependencies Dependency on other actors on the market Market, Operational
Network dependencies, Inno-
vation process
Large actors constrain technical development Technology
Governance, Network depen-
dencies, Innovation process
Insecurities in forceasting R&D success Technology, Opera-
tional, Market
Funding Insufficient equity availability Operational
Innovation process High fixed development costs Technology
Governance Limited information about the market devel-
opment
Market
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Governance Limited information about the latest technol-
ogy
Technology, Opera-
tional
Innovation process Customer acceptance of new products Market, Operational
Governance Slow decision making Operational
Governance Incorrect decision making Operational
Network dependencies Insufficient network structure increase nega-
tive networking effects
Operational
Funding VCs lack of knowledge about target firm core
competencies
Operational
Outsourcing Losing necessary competence Operational, Technol-
ogy
Outsourcing Problems with evaluating CM quality Quality
Outsourcing Reduced control of product quality Quality
Outsourcing Dependency on external partners, reduced
agility
Operational
Outsourcing Cost uncertainties Market
Outsourcing, Network depen-
dencies, Governance
Losing intellectual property Technology, Security
Firm size Small firms more profitable Operational
Firm size Small firms more time-dependent on invest-
ments
Operational
Firm size Small firms adapt high risk strategies Operational
Firm size Small firms have quicker responsiveness to
market changes
Market, Operational
Network dependencies Low R&D cooperation with outside institutes
increase failure risk
Operational, Technol-
ogy
Governance, Innovation pro-
cess
Competence is dependent on specific individ-
uals
Technology, Opera-
tional, HR
Firm size, Funding, Innova-
tion process
Unavailable funds for R&D in smaller firms Technology
Firm size, Innovation process Innovation process hindered due to organiza-
tional inertia
Technology
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Unexpected extra work to correct bad soft-
ware
Operational
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Legal claims due to poor software quality Quality
Outsourcing Problems with constructing legal contracts
with respect to quality
Quality
Outsourcing Decreased insight in the development process Technology
Outsourcing Cost control and incentives might miss when
outsourcing
Quality
Firm size Small firms to a smaller extent have a quality
program
Quality
Governance Mismanagement of cultural issues Operational, HR
Governance Top mgmt deterioration increase firm failure HR
Governance Small top mgmt teams increase failure risk HR
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Governance, Business phase Younger top mgmt teams tend to be more suc-
cessful
HR
Governance, Business phase Younger top mgmt teams tend to take higher
risks
HR
Governance Lower education level increase risk HR
Product properties Responsibility of recycling of own products Environmental
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties, Geographical location
Contributing to severe pollution in poor coun-
tries
Environmental
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties, Geographical location
Risk of law suits due to pollution Environmental
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Worker damage leading to law suits Environmental, HR,
Code of conduct
Geographic location Fraud Security
Geographic location Governmental instability Political
Geographic location Internal and external conflicts Political
Geographic location Religious and ethnic tensions Political
Geographic location Market corruption Market, Political
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Excessive work hours for personnel Code of conduct
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Wages lower than minimum allowed Code of conduct
Outsourcing, Product prop-
erties
Refusal of workers right to form unions Code of conduct
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